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… annually. Smart industrial robots, Seer’s focus, are expected to grow from RMB 22 billion (USD 3.1 billion) in 2024 to RMB 115 billion (USD 16.1 billion) in 2029, at a 39.2% annual rate.
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<h3>Standard Robots</h3>
Founded in 2016 and headquartered in Shenzhen, Standard Robots is among the largest providers of smart industrial AMR solutions. By shipment volume in 2024, it ranked second in the 3C segment, second in automotive, and fifth in semiconductors, according to CIC.
Nearly 90% of its revenue comes from customized industrial mobile robot solutions. Its primary customers are manufacturers deploying robots directly on production lines, though it also works with system integrators to expand reach. Most of its revenue still comes from mainland China.
The company began overseas expansion in 2019, first entering Japan. Since then, it has added clients in Vietnam, Thailand, and other regions. Overseas revenue contributed 10.2% of total revenue in 2022, 12.5% in 2023, and 24.1% in 2024.
Standard Robots invests heavily in R&amp;D. It allocated 33.5%, 32.8%, and 29.5% of revenue to R&amp;D in 2022, 2023, and 2024, respectively. Its efforts focus on operating systems, core algorithms, and its proprietary RoboVerse system, while also exploring embodied robotics and <a href="/industry/ai">artificial intelligence</a>.
On June 23, the company filed for a Hong Kong main board listing. Funds raised will support further development of these initiatives.
CIC projects that the intelligent mobile robotics market will grow from RMB 15.3 billion (USD 2.1 billion) in 2024 to RMB 81.4 billion (USD 11.4 billion) in 2029, at a compound annual rate of 39.8%.
<div class="embed-container"><iframe src="https://flo.uri.sh/visualisation/24787932/embed" frameborder="0" allowfullscreen> frameborder="0" scrolling="no" sandbox="allow-same-origin allow-forms allow-scripts allow-downloads allow-popups allow-popups-to-escape-sandbox allow-top-navigation-by-user-activation"></iframe></div>

Chinese AMR firms line up Hong Kong IPOs to test investor appetite

Deep Tech

China

On August 27, Zong Fuli submitted a formal complaint to China’s Supreme People’s Court and Supreme People’s Procuratorate, requesting expedited handling of a shareholder dispute involving the employee shareholding committee’s 24.6% stake in Hangzhou Wahaha Group. She has asked for a lawful and fair resolution to protect the company’s interests and settle the matter equitably.
The dispute stems from events following the death of her father, Zong Qinghou. Several retired and former employees have contested the terms of repurchase agreements they signed in 2018, bringing their objections to court. Wahaha’s legal team said all 2018 buybacks were executed with signed agreements, video records, and verified payments from both the group and the employee shareholding committee. The company maintains the plaintiffs’ claims lack factual and legal basis.
A former Wahaha employee told 36Kr that after Zong assumed control of the company, she required staff to amend their labor contracts under the Hongsheng Group umbrella. This led to a collective lawsuit from some former employees, who objected to both the buyback prices and the contract changes. Public records show the case entered judicial proceedings in September 2024.
According to one former employee, the 2018 buyback was not the first time Wahaha repurchased employee shares, but he described that instance as “forced.”
<blockquote>“In 2018, the company repurchased shares from employee shareholding committee members at RMB 2.1 (USD 0.3) per share after tax. Many long-serving sales staff and regional managers left as a result. While Zong Qinghou was still alive, people didn’t raise the issue publicly due to his authority. But Zong Fuli failed to manage relations with veteran employees. When sales got tough and even base salaries were being clawed back, things reached a breaking point.”</blockquote>
Speaking to 36Kr, Dong Yizhi, a lawyer with Joint-Win Partners in Shanghai, said Wahaha’s partial roots in state-owned enterprise reform make this a sensitive legacy issue:
<blockquote>“Legally speaking, employees in a shareholding committee have the right to assert their claims, but ultimately, the courts must determine the validity of those rights.”</blockquote>
Corporate data platform Aiqicha lists Wahaha Group’s shareholders as Zong Fuli (29.4%), the Shangcheng Investment Holding Group in Hangzhou (46%), and the employee shareholding committee (24.6%).
A Jiemian News report cited Wahaha’s legal team as saying that the group’s grassroots union committee still lists only Zong as its sole representative, and that a business registration change remains incomplete due to ongoing litigation.
In August, the Hong Kong High Court issued an injunction in a separate case involving a family trust dispute between Zong and her three siblings. The ruling barred her from withdrawing or transferring funds from Jian Hao Ventures’ HSBC account in Hong Kong. The restriction will remain until the Hangzhou Intermediate People’s Court and Zhejiang High People’s Court issue final judgments.
Wahaha’s legal counsel emphasized that the case brought by Du Jianying, mother of the three siblings, at the Hangzhou court does not involve Wahaha Group shares. The 29.4% stake previously held directly by Zong Qinghou was fully inherited by Zong Fuli under a notarized will, and that transfer has already been registered.
The outcome of the equity dispute could determine whether Zong ultimately becomes Wahaha Group’s largest shareholder.
KrASIA Connection features translated and adapted content that was originally published by 36Kr. This <a href="https://36kr.com/p/3441232471627394">article</a> was written by Xie Yunzi for 36Kr.

Wahaha heiress takes shareholder fight to China’s top court

… news or updates you'd like us to feature, get in touch with us at: <a href="mailto:hello@kr-asia.com">hello@kr-asia.com</a>.
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Deals in brief: Blitz and Tazapay raise funding, Rezolve.ai acquires ViSenze, 11 new China investments, and more

Venture Capital

Private Equity

Investment

Merger &amp; Acquisition

Singapore

Malaysia

Indonesia

Southeast Asia

India

… strategy that combines technology and finance can deliver through commercial deployment.
<figure id="attachment_149535" aria-describedby="caption-attachment-149535" style="width: 1920px" class="wp-caption alignnone"><img loading="lazy" decoding="async" class="wp-image-149535 size-full" src="https://console.kr-asia.com/wp-content/uploads/2024/08/Agibot-Expedition-A2-A2W.jpg" alt="Image of a humanoid robot from Agibot’s Expedition A2 series." width="1920" height="1080" srcset="https://console.kr-asia.com/wp-content/uploads/2024/08/Agibot-Expedition-A2-A2W.jpg 1920w, https://console.kr-asia.com/wp-content/uploads/2024/08/Agibot-Expedition-A2-A2W-300x169.jpg 300w, https://console.kr-asia.com/wp-content/uploads/2024/08/Agibot-Expedition-A2-A2W-1024x576.jpg 1024w, https://console.kr-asia.com/wp-content/uploads/2024/08/Agibot-Expedition-A2-A2W-768x432.jpg 768w, https://console.kr-asia.com/wp-content/uploads/2024/08/Agibot-Expedition-A2-A2W-1536x864.jpg 1536w, https://console.kr-asia.com/wp-content/uploads/2024/08/Agibot-Expedition-A2-A2W-480x270.jpg 480w" sizes="(max-width: 1920px) 100vw, 1920px" /><figcaption id="caption-attachment-149535" class="wp-caption-text">Image of a humanoid robot from Agibot’s <a href="https://kr-asia.com/agibot-unveils-five-humanoid-robots-commercialization-on-the-horizon">Expedition A2 series</a>. Image source: Agibot.</figcaption></figure>
<h3>China’s manufacturing position and three layers of global competition</h3>
Although the leading names in embodied intelligence appear to form a US versus China lineup, their supply chains look similar. Many manufacturers behind core components are based in China.
According to a Morgan Stanley <a href="https://advisor.morganstanley.com/john.howard/documents/field/j/jo/john-howard/The_Humanoid_100_-_Mapping_the_Humanoid_Robot_Value_Chain.pdf">report</a>, 56 of the 100 key companies in the humanoid robot value chain are Chinese, accounting for 63% of the supply chain. These include:
<ul>
<li aria-level="1">Reducers: Leaderdrive, Zhongda Leader Intelligent Transmission (ZD).</li>
<li aria-level="1">Motors: Inovance, Leadshine.</li>
<li aria-level="1">Sensors: Orbbec, W-Ibeda.</li>
<li aria-level="1">Manufacturing services: Lens Technology, PIA Automation, Ningbo Huaxiang (NBHX).</li>
</ul>
Tesla’s Optimus also relies on Chinese suppliers for crucial parts, such as Sanhua Intelligent Controls, Tuopu Group, Seenpin Electromechanical Transmission, and Beite Technology.
However, this manufacturing advantage may not last. The humanoid robotics race highlights three deeper issues.
First, supply chain leadership is not guaranteed. China’s 63% share rests on cost and efficiency, but if AI algorithms and localized production reduce design and manufacturing thresholds, today’s cost advantage could narrow. Another concern is whether the industry has focused too heavily on assembly. Unitree’s attempt at full-stack development is a useful step, yet China still lacks frontier-scale AI models, which form the core of the “brain.”
Second, the central question for technological sovereignty is whether the “brain” or the “body” matters more. The US holds advantages at the “brain” layer, including Grok, OpenAI systems, and VLA-style models. China leads at the “body” layer, with strengths in reducers, motors, sensors, and structural parts. A sophisticated robot design in the US depends on China’s supply chain to become a complete Optimus, while an affordable robot in China still requires robust AI to move beyond simple tasks. This interdependence is reshaping global technology competition, showing that neither technical leadership nor manufacturing strength alone is sufficient.
Third, Chinese enterprises must consider how to take greater initiative. Industrial revolutions tend to favor those who set standards and rules, and embodied intelligence is still at a stage where its technical paradigm has not been fixed. For now, the players with the most influence over emerging standards remain concentrated in the US.
China faces three gaps:
<ol>
<li aria-level="1">Foundational algorithm innovation: Architectures, such as transformers and diffusion models, largely originated in the US.</li>
<li aria-level="1">Model training theory: Advances, from backpropagation to reinforcement learning, have primarily been led by US research.</li>
<li aria-level="1">Compute paradigms: GPU-based parallelism and neuromorphic design have been shaped by US institutions and companies.</li>
</ol>
To move ahead, Chinese companies will need to go beyond engineering optimization and take part in shaping system-level paradigms.
<h3>Final thoughts</h3>
AI advances quickly. It took five years to move from GPT-1 to GPT-4, and commercial deployment of humanoid robots may take only three to five. In the AI era, China’s window to catch up is likely no more than ten years.
As AI takes over design and production optimization, the value of traditional manufacturing experience is diminishing. Companies that master core AI can shift manufacturing with ease, while those without it risk becoming little more than contract producers.
The timeline is shorter than it seems. The question is, are we ready?
This <a href="https://mp.weixin.qq.com/s/JAvGYj6GgVPY91Mxekq4DA">article</a> was adapted based on a feature originally written by Eastora (<a href="http://eastoragroup.com">eastoragroup.com</a>). KrASIA is authorized to translate, adapt, and publish its contents.

From sci-fi to factory floors: Humanoid robots at the crossroads of technology, capital, and ambition

Artificial Intelligence

Embodied Intelligence

Just less than a month after <a href="/company/luckin-coffee">Luckin Coffee</a> opened its two outlets in Manhattan, several storefronts in the bustling office area of midtown and the financial district were quickly emblazoned with an electric blue deer and the words "opening soon."
The Chinese coffee giant has entered the US, home to <a href="/company/starbucks">Starbucks</a>, rapidly expanding in the largest US city and adding to the list of battlegrounds on which the world's two largest economies compete.
Luckin Coffee has held the crown as China's top branded coffee chain since 2023, after it overtook Starbucks in both store locations and revenue.
Known for its app-based ordering system, with no cashiers and hardly any seating, Luckin is looking to replicate its success in the American market just as Starbucks looks to sunset its pickup-only stores.
At the heart of the company's strategy is data-driven customer engagement, done through its app-based system where customers can place orders in advance and pick them up at their convenience.
Aside from standard coffee orders, Luckin also offers a wide range of creative flavored drinks headlined by its signature coconut latte.
The drink retailer is also known to offer coupons and heavy discounts on its products. Outside one of the stores, both of which opened in July, was a signboard with QR codes offering USD 0.99 beverages for new customers.
"The flavors are interesting and it's affordable," said Chris Ng, a student. "It's quick and convenient for me and others who are always on the go."
Luckin Coffee opened 2,109 stores in four countries in the second quarter, more than double the number of new stores Starbucks opened in China during the 2024 fiscal year, and has capitalized on <a title="" href="https://asia.nikkei.com/business/business-trends/discount-coffee-hotels-thrive-in-china-s-penny-pinching-economy" target="_blank" rel="noopener">China's growing coffee-drinking habits</a>. Shops were opened last quarter in Malaysia, Singapore, Greater China, and the US, which marks its first entry into a market across the Pacific Ocean.
Jinyi Guo, co-founder of the company, acknowledged the highly developed coffee market in the US but hoped the company's unique business model will support its international expansion strategy.
"Our approach will be disciplined and deliberate, with a focus on validating consumer response to our brand positioning, digital ordering experience, product portfolio, and pricing strategy," he said during an earnings call with analysts.
Luckin and its US representatives did not respond to requests for comment.
Yaling Jiang, an independent consumer analyst, said Luckin's success boils down to two factors: keeping consumers hooked with innovative flavors and an accessible price point, as well as overcoming the pervasive negative perception of Chinese brands in the Western market.
"The media attention that Luckin has received may hurt the reception and ensure that consumers only see it from the filter of Chinese brand," said Jiang, who also runs Following The Yuan, a Chinese consumer newsletter.
Launched in 2017, the coffee retailer has managed to defy the odds and make a comeback after filing for bankruptcy just less than four years ago. Luckin Coffee was embroiled in an auditing scandal and the US Securities and Exchange Commission fined the company USD 180 million for intentionally fabricating its 2019 revenue and costs.
The company dismissed its founder Jenny Qian and its COO at the time Jian Liu, along with six employees in 2020. It later filed for bankruptcy in February 2021.
Luckin began exploring beyond its home border in 2023, landing in Singapore April that year. It has since opened stores in <a href="https://asia.nikkei.com/business/food-beverage/china-s-luckin-coffee-presses-into-malaysia-brews-plans-to-expand">Malaysia</a> too.
The company's expansion has disrupted Asian markets dominated by Starbucks and other local coffee chains.
<a href="/company/cotti-coffee">Cotti Coffee</a>, a rival Chinese coffee chain founded by Luckin's former executives, also landed on American soil earlier this year, opening outlets in Brooklyn and Manhattan.
whereRelatedArticle
The success of Chinese coffee chains and Luckin's nimble business model in the US remains to be seen, as automation is not as widely adopted in US consumer behavior.
Alice Nguyen, who works in finance, said she still prefers to interact with a server, despite how convenient it was to order a velvet latte on her mobile.
Starbucks announced it will close its pickup-only stores, of which there are 80–90 locations around the country, to restore its in-store experiences. Brian Niccol, CEO of the Seattle-headquartered company, said the mobile order and zero interaction model was "overly transactional and lacking the warmth and human connection that defines our brand."
Sales of the North American coffee giant, which has 17,000 locations across the US, have been declining six straight quarters, with US same-store sales falling 2% in the most recent quarter.
This article first appeared on <a href="https://asia.nikkei.com/business/food-beverage/luckin-coffee-races-into-starbucks-home-turf-with-app-based-strategy">Nikkei Asia</a>. It has been republished here as part of 36Kr’s ongoing partnership with <a href="https://www.kr-asia.com/nikkei-teams-up-with-36kr-in-asia-tech-news-coverage/">Nikkei</a>.

Luckin Coffee races into Starbucks' home turf with app-based strategy

Luckin Coffee

East Asia

Starbucks

Retail

Consumer Economy

Coffee

… 13 new IPs, expanding its total to about 50. R&amp;D spending rose to RMB 129 million (USD 18.1 million), up 69.5% year on year.
It also released 273 new SKUs, which accounted for 53.1% of revenue during the period. The goal is to broaden its audience beyond boys aged 6–16 who grew up on Ultraman. In 2024, Bloks launched products for adult collectors priced at RMB 100–200 (USD 14–28). In the first half of 2025, buyers aged 16 and above contributed 14.8% of revenue, up from 10.4% a year earlier.
The company has also tested products aimed at younger girls. IPs such as Yeluo Li and Pokémon underperformed, so Bloks is now shifting to scenario-based sets to target that demographic.
These efforts come at a cost. Rising R&amp;D spending, higher tooling fees from new SKUs, and the expansion of low-priced products dragged gross margin down 4.5 percentage points year on year.
The company also highlighted user experience in its report. Unlike Pop Mart, whose collectibles thrive on aesthetics and scarcity, construction toys rely on creativity. That explains why Lego invests heavily in community engagement, co-creation, and theme parks to reinforce its “creation” narrative.
Bloks is experimenting with a similar approach. This year, it is continuing the Blokees Figures Creators (BFC) competition across 150 cities in China. Parents traveled long distances with their children to attend, drawn by the belief that such contests foster creativity.
Founded in 2014, Bloks spent its first eight years as a block toy maker before pivoting to construction sets in 2022. The shift boosted margins and growth, culminating in its Hong Kong IPO. By mid-2024, it had partnered with more than 450 distributors, covering all top-tier cities in China and over 80% of lower-tier ones.
While Lego and Bandai Namco remain the global leaders, Bloks has risen quickly. By sidestepping Lego’s niche in small bricks and focusing instead on larger, more affordable pieces, it carved out a value-driven segment and built a broad offline distribution network.
Still young, Bloks has room to shape its own path. But its latest results underline the central question: how long it can monetize licensed IPs at scale, and whether that strategy will resonate both in China and overseas.
KrASIA Connection features translated and adapted content that was originally published by 36Kr. This <a href="https://36kr.com/p/3436401443474822">article</a> was written by Zhong Yixuan for 36Kr.

China’s Lego rival turns the page with first profit and global push

Hema NB doubles stores in six months to gain ground in China’s fragmented grocery market

Freshippo

… 2022 to 58.
Still, in hardware-heavy sectors, distribution can only go so far. Product quality and innovation remain key differentiators. The rise of Bambu Lab and xTool underlines this.
Creality’s selling expenses rose from 8.1% of revenue in 2022 to 16.7% in 2024. R&amp;D spending also increased but remained below 7% of revenue, a modest level by the standards of a product-led company.
That figure suggests the company may need to prioritize product development more aggressively.
Back in 2014, co-founder Liu noticed that most consumer 3D printers cost RMB 30,000–40,000 (USD 4,200–5,600). That insight led to the development of lower-cost alternatives and eventually to Creality’s global footprint.
The Covid-19 pandemic further boosted international demand and catalyzed growth. But it also intensified competition.
Going public may provide Creality with new resources and credibility. But as competition heats up across every category it touches, the IPO is just the beginning of a new challenge.
KrASIA Connection features translated and adapted content that was originally published by 36Kr. This <a href="https://36kr.com/p/3434757526982278">article</a> was written by Leslie Zhang for 36Kr.

Creality gears up for Hong Kong IPO as it looks beyond 3D printing

Hardware

Hong Kong

… willing to take harder paths, such as building its own digital system or sourcing food directly, when it believes they are the right ones.
“For example, our chive pockets always use chives we grow ourselves, because chives and long beans are high-risk for pesticide residue,” Jiang said. Dingdong uses pest control and soil management, among other practices, to reduce residue as much as possible.
Internally, Dingdong refers to its “tap water philosophy,” Liang’s vision that high-quality ingredients should flow into homes as easily as tap water. After 2025, Liang launched a “one inch wide, one kilometer deep” strategy focused on good users, good products, good service, and good mindshare.
Wang added that for Dingdong, “good products” means long-term value and differentiation. The goal is to win repeat purchases through quality, not by chasing SKU count or undercutting prices on items with marketing-heavy labels.
To strengthen category expertise, Dingdong reorganized its product development center into ten independent business units, each led by a core executive. Wang oversees fruit, Jiang leads vegetables, and Gong Yunhao heads dairy, liquor, and beverages. The structure spreads top management’s time across building and refining product competence.
<h3>How will Dingdong Maicai respond?</h3>
Accolade Wines’ China general manager, Su Huaici, observed that after the 2025 Lunar New Year, Dingdong tightened quality control:
<blockquote>“Station managers manually check every bottle of wine, and any minor flaw gets it returned.”</blockquote>
But the competitive landscape has shifted. According to Su, partnering with instant retail platforms has become a trend for traditional wine companies, and the scramble for instant retail traffic now resembles the boom years of fresh e-commerce.
Instant retail, also called quick commerce, means ordering online and receiving goods within 30 minutes offline. <a href="/company/meituan">Meituan’s</a> Shangou warehouses illustrate the model: by not optimizing for in-store traffic, they can carry more SKUs than similarly sized frontend warehouses and face minimal spoilage.
As the instant retail space heats up, fresh e-commerce has entered a new round of price wars. In June, 7Fresh, previously focused on large hybrid facilities, announced 18 new locations in the Beijing-Tianjin region and pledged to widen its price advantage from 10% to 20%. Around the same time, Hema cut prices in Shanghai, lowering averages on more than 300 items by nearly 20%.
“In today’s environment, we have to be rational. Dingdong will not join a price war,” CFO Wang said. He outlined Dingdong’s plan to 36Kr: stick with the frontend warehouse model; deepen its presence in Jiangsu, Zhejiang, and Shanghai while keeping a foothold in Beijing; and keep upgrading algorithms and product capabilities.
Even while avoiding price wars, Dingdong stays active in instant retail through B2B partnerships with platforms such as Ele.me, Taobao Maicai, and Douyin. These linkages help keep it in the game.
Meanwhile, Xiaoxiang Supermarket has pledged to cover all first- and second-tier cities and expand into 200 quality county-level agricultural areas through direct sourcing. If Xiaoxiang secures markets outside eastern China, could Dingdong lose the chance to expand beyond its home base?
“In fresh e-commerce, we should be cautious about whether scale growth brings real economic benefit,” Wang said. “If the market expects Dingdong to keep growing 15–20% annually, eastern China’s growth alone can fully support that.”
He disclosed that Dingdong’s monthly household purchase penetration is about 30% in Shanghai and 25% in Suzhou and Hangzhou. “I’ve told investors many times: in eastern China, Dingdong still has at least twofold growth potential. Eastern China is not our final horizon, but when we expand will depend on supply chain capacity.”
As for why Dingdong survived while Missfresh failed, people most often cite steadiness and pragmatism, reflected in strong cohesion and fast reactions. At a supplier conference, founder Liang offered his view:
<blockquote>“In more than eight years of building this business, Dingdong has done only one thing: we bring vegetables from Xinjiang, Ningxia, Gansu, and Yunnan to Shanghai, Hangzhou, and Suzhou. The reason we’ve been profitable for ten straight quarters is also one thing: we reduced waste.”</blockquote>
“For more than three years, most of our decisions have been made by walking, watching, and adjusting as we go,” Wang added.
Wang said Dingdong values its quarterly meetings. Even if the core team has reached a conclusion, it still spends three days aligning everyone by discussing key questions, such as whether to roll out Shanghai’s product set to other cities, or whether to expand into new scenarios.
With the expansion narrative back under its control, Dingdong is now taking a more focused long-term path.
In Q1 2025, Dingdong’s net profit fell 34.96% YoY, raising questions about whether profitability had peaked. The company attributed the drop to short-term cost pressure from regional deepening and projected that both scale and margins would improve by year’s end.
In Liang’s plan, for the foreseeable future Dingdong will go deeper and be more focused on product strength, supply chain, and digital capability. Meanwhile, it will expand SKUs and its nationwide footprint more shallowly and slowly.
There is nothing new under the sun: a slower expansion may bring competitive pressure in the short term, but it helps a company adjust course in a volatile market. At Dingdong, that all stems from a collective rethinking of the old pursuit of scale for scale’s sake.
KrASIA Connection features translated and adapted content that was originally published by 36Kr. This <a href="https://36kr.com/p/3414038846492288">article</a> was written by Xie Yunzi for 36Kr.

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