Chinese electric vehicle maker Jiyue Auto has been under intense scrutiny this past week, with much of the attention focused on its financial troubles and complex relationships with key stakeholders Baidu and Geely.
On December 16, Jiyue CEO Xia Yiping took to social media to deny rumors that he had fled, admitting instead to his shortcomings. “The fault is mine—all of it,” Xia wrote, citing overoptimism and a failure to anticipate the severity of the company’s funding issues.
How, then, did Xia come to lead the automaking venture? A former Jiyue employee recently shared more context with 36Kr, shedding light on the origins of Xia’s appointment.
“Xia wasn’t even Robin Li’s first choice—he initially failed the interview process,” the source revealed. Baidu had approached several candidates for the CEO role before eventually selecting Xia, following strong recommendations from others within the company.
Jiyue’s struggles are not unique in China’s new energy vehicle (NEV) industry. Brands like Weltmeister, HiPhi, and Neta have also appeared on lists of failing NEV companies. However, unlike its peers, Jiyue is backed by two giants—Geely and Baidu. Theoretically, this partnership gave it significant financial, technical, and operational advantages, including access to advanced hardware, software, and production support.
Yet, according to the insider, Jiyue’s challenges began at its inception, rooted in a misalignment between Xia and Baidu’s goals. While Baidu hoped Xia would act as a professional manager, Xia reportedly positioned himself as the company’s founder.
Xia’s credentials include stints at Ford and Fiat Chrysler, where he worked on connected car technologies. He later co-founded Mobike in 2015, which was acquired by Meituan for USD 2.7 billion three years later. However, the insider argued that Xia lacked the operational and managerial experience needed to run an automaking venture.
By 2021, Jiyue’s organizational structure reflected this misstep. While key departments like manufacturing, product planning, and after-sales were led by experienced automotive industry professionals, critical functions—including branding, human resources, business development, digital marketing, public relations, and sales—were largely staffed with personnel from Mobike or Xia’s personal circle. According to the source, these hires lacked relevant experience and failed to establish a strong foundation for Jiyue’s brand.
On a day-to-day basis, Xia reportedly struggled to provide effective leadership. The insider noted that meetings often dragged on for hours, with Xia’s speeches lacking focus on actionable business problems, leading to ineffective outcomes. Jiyue’s financial collapse has also been attributed to poor cash flow management, internal financial disorder, and the absence of an exit strategy.
Jiyue’s downfall comes amid a broader reshuffling of China’s NEV market. But what makes its story particularly instructive is the disparity between its abundant resources and its current state of disbandment.
The following interview was conducted by 36Kr with the former Jiyue employee, hereafter referred to by the pseudonym “A.” This interview has been edited and consolidated for brevity and clarity.
36Kr: Are you surprised that Jiyue has reached its current situation?
A: Not at all. Robin Li and Xia Yiping’s goals were misaligned from the outset. Li, as Baidu’s founder and a successful first-generation internet entrepreneur in China, hired Xia with hopes of finding a new commercialization path for Baidu.
But Xia treated Jiyue as his personal venture, using it to chase his own ambitions. He saw himself as the founder, operating in a manner similar to some private entrepreneurs—often disregarding rules and norms.
For example, he once required employees to work overtime during the National Day holiday without pay. Despite being warned by the human resources department that this violated labor laws, he persisted. Xia behaved more like someone who thought he owned the company, rather than as a professional manager.
36Kr: Running a company like a personal venture is sometimes seen as entrepreneurial spirit. Is that necessarily a bad thing?
A: When things are going well, it’s “his company.” But when things go wrong, it becomes the stakeholders’ problem. When Jiyue encountered difficulties, Xia confronted Baidu instead of pushing for proper bankruptcy procedures or an exit strategy. He may not have even considered preparing one. This deflection of responsibility caused significant harm to society, the industry, employees, car owners, and suppliers.
On Xiaohongshu, Xia describes himself as “the one who knows artificial intelligence best in the automotive industry, and who knows cars best in the AI field.” He presented himself to Li as an automotive expert, but internally, he showed little respect for professionals in the automotive and manufacturing industries. He often belittled employees with automotive backgrounds and spoke dismissively of Geely.
36Kr: Do you think Baidu made the wrong choice in hiring Xia?
A: Yes. Baidu’s understanding of the automotive industry may have been insufficient, leading to unclear criteria for assessing the capabilities needed for a leader. Known for its technological strength, Baidu likely overemphasized technical expertise while neglecting critical skills like industry experience, operational management, financing, branding, and market development. This mismatch between leadership capabilities and the role’s requirements led to many of Jiyue’s problems.
Xia wasn’t even Robin Li’s first choice—he initially failed the interview process. According to industry insiders, Baidu had approached several seasoned candidates who ultimately declined the role for various reasons. Xia was selected from the remaining pool of candidates.
36Kr: How much influence did Xia’s past experiences, especially at Mobike, have on his management of Jiyue?
A: Xia frequently touted Mobike’s achievements as proof of his capabilities. He seemed fixated on past successes instead of addressing Jiyue’s current challenges.
However, media reports revealed troubling behavior during Mobike’s acquisition phase. After voting in favor of the deal in a board meeting, he reversed his stance two days later at a shareholders’ meeting—actions that exploited information asymmetry to serve his interests.
The reality is that Xia’s experience at Mobike had little relevance to running an automaker. Successful cross-industry leaders approach the automotive industry with deep respect, learning from its history and building tailored strategies. Xia lacked this humility and willingness to adapt.
36Kr: What was Xia’s management style like inside Jiyue?
A: Xia’s management style was authoritarian. Even in areas where he lacked expertise, he imposed his decisions. Silence in meetings was interpreted as agreement. He often claimed to be a “branding expert” or “marketing expert,” using these self-proclaimed titles to justify his agenda.
At times, he even referred to himself as “China’s Elon Musk,” citing praise from some media outlets to reinforce this image.
36Kr: Did Xia successfully apply Mobike’s experiences to Jiyue?
A: Xia often mentioned Mobike’s “growth flywheel” approach, claiming credit for the company’s success. However, this strategy was fundamentally unsuited to Jiyue.
Mobike relied on frequent bicycle usage, rapid data accumulation, and internet subsidies to drive growth. In contrast, the automotive industry is a low-frequency, long-cycle field with a complex industrial chain. The growth flywheel simply did not apply.
More importantly, Xia’s supposed success in managing Mobike’s growth seemed largely theoretical and failed to translate into actionable strategies. He claimed to have learned negotiation tactics with investors at Mobike, but these skills proved ineffective at Jiyue. This is because Jiyue’s primary investors—Baidu and Geely—were also its key stakeholders from the very beginning, leaving little room for negotiation. Instead of attracting additional funding, Jiyue ultimately faced a complete breakdown in its capital chain.
36Kr: Could Xia have done anything differently to prevent Jiyue’s financial troubles?
A: From a business perspective, Xia should have approached pricing wars more cautiously. Violating basic business principles to meet personal sales commitments to the board put Jiyue in an unsustainable operational state. Reports suggest Jiyue still owes Geely significant manufacturing fees.
Additionally, the company’s workforce size was misaligned with its business scale. With fewer than 3,000 units sold and low profit margins, it’s hard to justify expanding the workforce to 5,000 employees, which led to massive operational costs.
36Kr: What does Jiyue’s current plight means for the NEV industry?
A: Xia’s preference for quick results came with significant risks. For example, he hired a former executive from Apple’s car project, who was later investigated by the FBI for allegedly stealing confidential data. The incident escalated into a diplomatic issue involving China’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs, harming Baidu and damaging the global reputation of Chinese automakers.
Xia’s hasty dissolution of Jiyue also had far-reaching consequences, impacting thousands of employees, car owners, suppliers, and industry decision-makers. His actions revealed glaring deficiencies in management and talent utilization.
There has been speculation that Jiyue’s failure highlights the risks of entrusting a company to a figurehead rather than to someone with deep roots in the industry. Critics argue that Li, instead of personally steering the company, delegated its management to a professional manager like Xia Yiping. However, I believe this perspective is overly simplistic—it views Baidu’s carmaking efforts purely through the lens of an internet company.
Xia’s impact on the NEV industry serves as a cautionary tale that “one bad apple can spoil the barrel.” But it’s an isolated case. The industry must continue to encourage companies with innovative, grounded approaches. As William Li, CEO of Nio, once said in a speech at Harvard University, “Collaboration is always the best option.”
KrASIA Connection features translated and adapted content that was originally published by 36Kr. This article was written by Tian Zhe for 36Kr.